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I

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this case
pursuant to Utah Code Ann, S 78-2-2 (1953); and Article VIII,
Section 4 of the Utah State Constitution.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

The primary issue in this case is whether the trial

court properly granted Defendants' motions for summary judgment
based on the pleadings in the case as well as Plaintiff's
deposition.

The standard for review is set out in Hansen v.

Stewart. 761 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 1988).
2.

Secondarily, there is an issue as to whether the

Plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial, as a matter of right, on
the issue of the statute of limitations, because of the
bifurcation statute, Utah Code Ann. S 78-12-47 (1987).
CONTROLLING STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-14(1) (1979), provides:
(1) No malpractice action against a health care
provider may be brought unless it is commenced within
two years after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or
through the use of reasonable diligence should have
discovered the injury, whichever first occurs, but not
to exceed four years after the date of the alleged act,
omission, neglect or occurrence. . . .
Utah Code Ann. S 78-12-47 (1971), provides:
In any action against a physician and surgeon
• . . for professional negligence . . . if the
responsible pleading of the defendant pleads that the
action is barred by the statute of limitations, and if
either party so moves the court, the issue raised
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thereby may be tried separately and before other issues
in the case are tried. . . .
STATEMENT OF CASE
This case involves a claim fox medical malpractice. The
claimed malpractice took place in April, 1985. The Plaintiff did
nothing to protect her claim until November, 1988. After taking
the Plaintiff's deposition, the Defendants moved for summary
judgment based on the applicable statute of limitations, Section
78-14-4, Utah Code Ann. (1979).

The trial judge granted the

Motion for Summary Judgment and also denied Plaintiff's Motion to
Alter or Amend the Judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Plaintiff's statement of facts is accurate, but is
misleading and incomplete.

It emphasizes only certain aspects of

Plaintiff's testimony but does not give the Court the full basis
upon which the trial judge granted Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment.

For those reasons, this respondent sets forth the

following additional factual statements:
1.

This case involves a claim of medical malpractice

arising out of Defendants' alleged negligent failure to diagnose
breast cancer on April 3, 1985.
2.

On April 3, 1985, Plaintiff went to the Ogden Clinic,

at which time Dr. Boyd Farr examined a lump on the Plaintiff's
right breast.

He then consulted with Dr. Chris Christensen
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regarding the nature of the lump.

Dr. Farr told the Plaintiff to

return in three months to check the lump again.

(Plaintiff's

Deposition p. 11).
3.

During the next three months, the patient was

instructed to examine herself regularly.

Accordingly, at least

once a week, she made self-examinations of the lump.

She didn't

notice any change in either the hardness of the lump, its
location or its size until July of 1985.

(Plaintiff's

Deposition, pp. 14, 15).
4.

"Just within probably a few days," the lump seemed to

get much larger so the Plaintiff went to see Dr. Gardner for a
different opinion.
5.

(Plaintiff's Deposition, p. 15).

When the Plaintiff saw Dr. Gardner in the middle of

July, 1985, she was informed the lump was probably cancerous.
(Plaintiff's Deposition, p. 16).
6.

Dr. Gardner biopsied the lump on July 17, 1985. That

same date Plaintiff received the results of the biopsy.

She was

informed by Dr. Gardner that the lump "was definitely cancer and
that she needed to have surgery."

When the Plaintiff asked him

about the examinations by Defendants three months earlier,
Plaintiff testified:

"[Dr. Gardner] looked at the records and

[Defendants] had measured it and he said it had grown about three
times that size since my visit with him and it was definitely the
same lump."

(Plaintiff's Deposition, pp. 17-18, 23-25).
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7.

On July 19, 1985, Dr. Gardner performed a modified

radical mastectomy to treat the cancerous mass in the Plaintiff's
right breast.
8.

(Plaintiff's Deposition, p. 18).

As early as July, 1985, when she learned that she had

cancer, the Plaintiff was upset with Defendants.

She testified:

Q.

Were you upset in July of 1985, emotionally upset
with Dr. Farr when you learned that you had
cancer?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Why were you upset with him?

A.

Because I thought I trusted him.

Q.

Why did you feel he had violated your trust?

A.

Because I had cancer.

Q.

And you felt he should have discovered the cancer
in April, 1985?

A.

Yes.

(Plaintiff's Deposition, p. 27).
Q.

In July of 1985, when Dr. Gardner informed you you
had cancer, you were upset with Dr. Farr because
you felt he should have found the cancer that you
believe to be the same one in April of 1985,
correct?

A.

Right.

(Plaintiff's Deposition, p. 28).
Q.

At that time when you were told that and you
thought back why didn't they diagnose it earlier,
did you think that would have somehow made a
difference in the treatment you received?

A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

Why did you think it would make a difference?
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A.

Because I thought they could have done a
lumpectomy and maybe in that three month's time it
hadn't spread, so maybe I wouldn't have had to go
through the chemotherapy.

Q.

And that's what you thought when Dr. Gardner told
you you had cancer?

A.

I didn't think about the chemotherapy, but I
thought about the lumpectomy, that maybe that
could have been done.

Q.

Did you then think that maybe it would have
resulted in a different prognosis as far as the
ultimate outcome of your cancer?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did you have somehow in your mind the thought that
early diagnosis of breast cancer results in better
cure rates?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And that went through your mind back when Dr.
Gardner told you you had cancer in July of 1985?

A.

Yes.

(Plaintiff's Deposition, pp. 36-37).
Q.
You told Mr. Campbell a few minutes ago that when
Dr. Gardner told you you had cancer following the
biopsy you were angry; is that right?
A.

Yes, I was.

Q.

Were you angry at Dr. Christensen as well as Dr.
Farr?

A.

Yes.

Q.
A.

Were you more angry at one than the other?
No.

Q.

Just both of them?
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A.

Yes.

Q.

Why were you angry?

A.

Because both of them had checked me out three
months earlier and told me I didn't have cancer.

(Plaintiff's Deposition, pp. 35-36).
Q.

You felt in your own mind at that time that Dr.
Farr and Dr. Christensen had made a mistake?

A.

Yes.

Q.

You really felt they should have picked up this
cancer in April?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And you still feel that way?

A.

Yes.

(Plaintiff's Deposition, pp. 38-39).
Q.

So you already had those feelings, didn't you, the
feelings that they had somehow mistreated you?

A.

Right.

Q.

And you had those feelings for by them three
years?

A.

I didn't even start thinking about that until I
was able -- of chemotherapy. I knew they had
screwed up, but it wasn't on my mind every day.

(Plaintiff's Deposition, pp. 56-57).
9.

The Plaintiff did not gain any factual information

concerning either the injury she claims she has suffered, or the
claimed negligence of the Defendants between August, 1985, and
October, 1988.

(Plaintiff's Deposition, p. 28).
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10.

The treatment for Plaintiff's cancer, including the

chemotherapy, was completed in February, 1986.

She had no

further treatment by way of radiation therapy or chemotherapy
after that time.
11.

(Plaintiff's Deposition, p. 19).

The reason the Plaintiff decided to make a claim

against the Defendants was because she went to Dr. Stephan
Ralston on September 9, 1988, to investigate the possibility of
having reconstructive surgery done.

She discovered that she

probably could not afford to have the surgery, and that was what
started her thinking about filing a lawsuit.

It was nothing

Dr. Ralston said about the treatment by Dr. Christensen or
Dr. Farr that caused her to think she had a valid malpractice
claim.
12.

(Plaintiff's Deposition, pp. 55-56).
Defendants were not served with a Notice of Intent to

Commence Action until November 1, 1988, over three years after
Plaintiff knew that Defendants had failed to diagnose her breast
cancer.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1.

The district court properly granted Defendants' motions

for summary judgment because Plaintiff's claims were barred by
the applicable statute of limitations.

The Health Care

Malpractice Act requires plaintiffs to commence suit within two
years after they discover, or through the use of reasonable
diligence should have discovered, the injury.
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Plaintiff's own

testimony established that she knew, or through the use of
reasonable diligence should have known, that she had sustained an
injury that was attributable to the alleged negligent conduct of
the Defendant.
2.

The Plaintiff has misconstrued the applicable test to

determine when the statute of limitations begins.

The criteria

urged by the Plaintiff has no basis in fact or law.
3.

Actual knowledge of medical negligence is not requisite

to commence running of the statute.
4.

The independent trial on the statute of limitations

issue provided by the Health Care Malpractice Act is subject to
summary judgment, like all other issues, if no genuine issues of
material fact are raised.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. THE PLAINTIFF KNEW, OR
SHOULD HAVE KNOWN, OF THE EXISTENCE OF HER
INJURY AND THAT THE INJURY COULD BE
ATTRIBUTED TO THE NEGLIGENCE OF DEFENDANTS.
The court is to grant summary judgment when it determines
that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact."

Utah

R.Civ.P. 56(c).
In Floyd v. Western Surgical Assoc, 773 P.2d 402 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989), the Utah Supreme Court stated:

"On appeal from a

summary judgment, we view the evidence presented to the trial
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court in the light most favorable to the losing party."
403.

Id. at

"When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a trial

court may consider the affidavits, pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file."

Utah

R.Civ.P. 56(c); Floyd, 773 P.2d at 403.
In granting Defendants' motions for Summary Judgment, the
trial court was faced with the issue of whether Plaintiff's
claims were time-barred.

The Health Care Malpractice Act states:

No malpractice action against a health care provider
may be brought unless it is commenced within two years
after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through
the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered,
the injury, whichever first occurs . . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(1) (1979).

The trial court held that as

early as July, 1985 Plaintiff had knowledge of the existence of
an injury, its cause and the possibility of negligence.
Based on testimony by the Plaintiff during her deposition on
September 29, 1989, the Plaintiff learned by mid-July, 1985, that
Dr. Christensen failed to diagnose breast cancer during an
examination in April, 1985. Another physician, Dr. Gardner,
biopsied the lump and diagnosed cancer on July 17, 1985. The
Plaintiff testified that by July she knew the doctors had missed
the cancer and had they realized the full extent of her problems
in April, she may have had better results.
Plaintiff's counsel asserts that the district court erred by
not construing the facts in the light most favorable to the
Plaintiff.

Plaintiff's counsel offers no basis for this

-9-

assertion other than a legal conclusion that had the district
court construed the facts in a light most favorable to the
Plaintiff, it would have found that there was a genuine issue of
fact.
Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth
that a plaintiff or defendant cannot rely upon the mere
allegations or denials of her pleadings to avoid a summary
judgment but must set forth specific facts showing that there is
a genuine issue for trial.

See Hall v. Fitzgerald, 671 P.2d 224,

226 (Utah 1983); Thornock v. Cook, 604 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1979).
The Plaintiff cannot rely on the bare assertion in her
Complaint that she did not know that her injury was caused by
another party's negligence to create an issue of fact that would
preclude summary judgment.
In Foil v. Ballinaer, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979), the Utah
Supreme Court held that in order for the statute to begin to run,
the patient must know, or through the use of reasonable diligence
should have known, that he sustained some injury and that the
injury suffered can be attributed to the negligent conduct on the
part of the Defendant.

Id. at 155.

From the quoted testimony

under the "Facts" section of this Brief, it is clear that by July
of 1985, the Plaintiff discovered an injury and attributed the
cause of that injury to the alleged negligent conduct of the
Defendant.

Nothing more is required under Foil to trigger the

running of the two-year statute of limitations.
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The Plaintiff's

deposition extinguished any issue of fact by explicitly setting
forth that the Plaintiff knew on July 17, 1985 that
Dr. Christensen had made a mistake by not discovering cancer in
April and had Dr. Christensen detected cancer the results might
have been less severe.
POINT II
THE COURT OF APPEALS CASE CITED BY PLAINTIFF
DID NOT MODIFY THE LEADING SUPREME COURT CASE
THAT SET FORTH THE CRITERIA FOR INVOKING THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
CASES.
Plaintiff's Brief asserts that the Foil case, 601 P.2d 144
(Utah 1979), was modified by Deschamps v. Pulley, 784 P.2d 471
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).

Foil establishes that the statutory two-

year limitations period does not commence to run until the
injured person (1) knows or should know that she has sustained an
injury, and (2) knows or should know that this injury was caused
by negligence.

Foil, supra at 147. Plaintiff's counsel

misconstrues Deschamps to hold that the two-year statute of
limitations period should not commence to run until the injured
person (1) knows or should know that she has sustained an injury,
and (2) knows, or with the exercise of reasonable diligence,
should know of the existence of a reasonable possibility of
medical negligence.
Aside from the fact that Court of Appeals decisions do not
supersede Supreme Court decisions, nowhere in Deschamps does the
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court state that they are modifying the Foil test.

In fact, the

court in Deschamps held that the plaintiff "knew or should have
known more than two years before she filed this action that her
mother's death was the result of the health care provider's
negligence."

Deschamps, supra at 475. This language is directly

from the Foil test and mentions nothing about "reasonable
possibility of negligence" as urged by Plaintiff's counsel.

The

court further stated that the plaintiff "was aware of her legal
injury under the Foil test . . . ." Again, the court mentioned
nothing about a modified Foil test.
Plaintiff's counsel bases his modified version of the Foil
test on a portion of Hargett v. Llmbero, F.Supp. 152 (D. Utah
1984) cited in Deschamps which states:
[T]he crucial question is whether the plaintiff was
aware of the facts that would lead a reasonable person
to conclude that he may have a cause of action against
the health care provider. Those facts include the
existence of an injury, its cause and the possibility
of negligence.
Hargett, 598 F.Supp. at 155 (citations omitted).

After a few

sleight of the hands, Plaintiff's counsel comes up with a new
test that takes "reasonable person" and "possibility of
negligence" and forms "reasonable possibility of medical
negligence."
As stated previously, the court in Deschamps did not modify
the Foil test and their holding confirms that they are applying
an unmodified Foil test.
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POINT III
AN EXPERT MEDICAL OPINION CONFIRMING MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE IS NOT NEEDED BEFORE THE TOLLING
OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BEGIN.
Plaintiff contends that it is not reasonable to require a
lay person such as the Plaintiff to make a causal connection
between Defendants' failure to diagnose her cancer and any
possible injury she may have suffered as a result, without first
obtaining further information from some educated source.
In Deschamps, supra, the Court of Appeals responded to this
assertion as follows:
If we accepted [plaintiff's] position that she could
not know of her legal injury until she received an
expert medical opinion confirming malpractice, the
statute would be tolled in every case until a plaintiff
not only decided to seek, but found favorable expert
medical testimony. We do not believe this result is
consistent with the purpose of the statutory scheme.
Id. at 475 (footnotes omitted).
Plaintiff argues that because the doctor who supervised her
chemotherapy and the doctor who performed her sterilization
therapy would not confirm medical malpractice, the statute of
limitations did not begin to run until such confirmation was
obtained from an educated source.

If Plaintiff's argument were

taken to the extreme, it would mean that the statute of
limitations would not begin to run until there was a jury verdict
concluding that medical malpractice existed.
Similarly, as the court in Deschamps would not accept the
position that an expert medical opinion confirming medical
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malpractice is needed before the tolling of the statute of
limitations begins, neither should the Plaintiff in the case at
hand be allowed to do so.
POINT IV
THE INDEPENDENT TRIAL ON THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS ISSUE PROVIDED BY THE HEALTH CARE
MALPRACTICE ACT IS SUBJECT TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IF
NO GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT ARE RAISED.
Plaintiff's counsel asserts that the Utah Supreme Court
disfavors the granting of summary judgment in medical malpractice
cases because of the existence of a statutory provision for a
separate trial on the issue of the running of the statute of
limitations.

The statute says:

In any action against a physician . . . if the
responsive pleading of the defendant pleads that the
action is barred by this statute of limitations/ and if
either party so moves the court, the issue raised
thereby may be tried separately before any issues in
the case are tried.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-47 (1971).
In addressing the application of an independent trial on the
statute of limitations issue, the Utah Supreme court stated that
ff

[i]t is, however, like all other issues, subject to summary

judgment if no genuine issues of material fact are raised."
Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93, 100 (Utah 1982).

See also

Am.Jur.2d, Limitation of Actions, S 470; 61 A.L.R.2d 341.
Plaintiff bases her assertion on Justice Durham's holding in
Brower v. Brown, 744 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1987).
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Plaintiff fails to

mention that Justice Durham's position was not a majority with
respect to the issue on whether the plaintiff knew she had
received a legal injury.

Justice Zimmerman, for an equally

divided court, held that as a matter of law the plaintiff was on
notice that she had a legal injury and the trial court's summary
judgment on this issue should be affirmed.

Id. at 1340.

Additionally, Justice Durham held that the trial court improperly
granted summary judgment because the facts were unclear that the
plaintiff should have known of her legal injuries when the
negligence occurred.

Id. at 1339.

Nowhere in the opinion does

it state that a motion for summary judgment in medical
malpractice cases is disfavored where the issue is the running of
the statute of limitations, as urged in Plaintiff's Brief.
CONCLUSION
The Plaintiff did not file her claim within the requisite
time period.

The logical extension of her argument would result

in total emasculation of the Utah Healthcare Malpractice Act.
Based on her own testimony, the trial court found that there is
no genuine issue of material fact, and that opinion should be
affirmed.
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